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Abstract 
Extant organizational research into crises has focused on the efforts of different actors to defend 
and legitimate their ideologies towards particular actions. Although insightful, such research has 
offered little knowledge about the moral reasoning underlying such action. In this paper, we ex-
plore how moral reasoning from different ideological viewpoints can lead to polarised debates 
and stalemate within the context of ecological crises. We apply our conceptual framework in an 
analysis of the 19th Century French Phylloxera Epidemic (hereafter the Phylloxera Epidemic). 
Drawing upon this analysis, we argue that, by adapting their moral reasoning, opposing stake-
holder groups could maintain their underlying ideology, while at the same time pragmatically 
changing their actions towards the crisis. We discuss the theoretical implications of our analysis 
for historical research in organizational studies and research on organizations and the natural 
environment. (135 words) 
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Introduction 
In the late 19th Century, an epidemic caused by an aphid-like insect known as the phylloxera de-
stroyed two-thirds of all European vineyards, generating profound economic and societal impli-
cations. The Phylloxera Epidemic spanned several decades, with the insect arriving in Europe 
from America in the 1860s. The struggle to save the vine led to a vociferous debate over the 
cause of, and response to, the epidemic, that involved over 30 years of stalemate and failure be-
fore effective solutions could finally be implemented. 
On one side, the ‘disease as effect’ theory was held by the ‘Theists’, who were mainly 
comprised of members from the French Academy of Sciences, the Ministry of Agriculture, and 
the Catholic Church. The Theists reasoned that if the phylloxera was a parasite native to the 
Americas, American vines would have succumbed long ago (Pouget, 1990). Instead, the Theists 
believed that it was neglectful farmers who employed expedient farming practices that made 
their vines susceptible to adverse weather conditions and parasites such as the phylloxera (Gale, 
2003). 
On the other side, the ‘Darwinists’ held to the ‘disease as cause’ theory, whose main pro-
tagonists were: Jules-Émile Planchon and his Montpellier colleagues, Charles Valentine Riley, the 
Missouri State Entomologist, and Charles Darwin, among other notable scientists (Desmond & 
Moore, 1992). The Darwinists drew upon Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution to inductively 
reason that the host and parasite had co-evolved, resulting in gradual adaptations that afforded 
American vines relative immunity from and resistance to the Phylloxera. 
Examining the debate in more depth, we find that beyond the political efforts of each 
stakeholder group to define their domination over the other through discourse (Grant & Hardy, 
2003; Thompson, 1985), their ideological conflict created a sharp polarisation and thus a delay in 
deciding how to respond to the crisis. It was through adaptation in their respective processes of 
reasoning that opposing groups could overcome the impasse and mobilise collective action to 
develop and implement viable solutions. 
Similar to the Phylloxera Epidemic, other ecological crises such as HIV, the Ebola and 
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Zika viruses began as relatively isolated infections but have since evolved into global pandemics 
(Leach, Scoones, & Stirling, 2010). Although the causes of these crises vary, as do their impact, a 
common theme is the role of morality in guiding political choices that ultimately make a differ-
ence between societal collapse and sustainability (Diamond, 2006). 
Organisational studies into crises have focused on the discursive efforts of different actors 
to defend and legitimate their ideologies (Boin, 't Hart, & Mcconnel, 2009; Erkama & Vaara, 
2010; Mueller, Sillince, Harvey, & Howarth, 2004; Samra-Fredericks, 2004; Wodak, 2015). As yet 
however, there has been relatively little attention given to the role of morality in these discursive 
efforts. 
 In this paper, we build on research into the relation between cognition and language 
(Johnson, 1994; Lakoff, 2002; Lakoff & Johnson, 1985; Rosch & Lloyd, 1978). We define ideo-
logy as a system of frames, with each frame composed of interrelated conceptual metaphors, that 
actors draw upon to make sense of a situation. This system of frames is mediated through a pro-
cess of moral reasoning that determines which frames are prioritised and how their constituent 
conceptual metaphors are applied to specific situations (Johnson, 1994). A conceptual metaphor 
is a way of conceptualising one domain of experience in terms of another (Cornelissen, 2005; 
Cornelissen, Holt, & Zundel, 2011; Morgan, 1986; Tsoukas, 1991) – for example conceptualising 
the moral act of ‘reciprocation’ through the economic concept of ‘debt’ (e.g. ‘I owe someone 
gratitude’). Thus, actors do not act based on a fixed set of moral laws, but rather they morally 
reason, through frames and conceptual metaphors, how to act in a given situation. From this, we 
develop a framework, which helps us to understand the relationship between ideology, moral 
reasoning and how different stakeholder groups frame ecological crises.  
The key contribution of this paper is to extend our current understanding of how different 
groups frame a crisis based on their ideology, by emphasising the role of moral reasoning in this 
process. Past research has discussed the concept of morality, but only as part of rhetorical strate-
gies of legitimation, whereby actors invoke emotive moral claims to appeal to human concerns 
(Erkama & Vaara, 2010; Vaara & Tienari, 2002), and to express emotion or ‘move an audience’ 
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(Samra-Fredericks, 2004). Although these studies illuminate how moral claims can move com-
municative action, they have not offered a deeper analysis of the underlying reasoning upon 
which these claims are arrived at. We argue that identifying and examining this process of moral 
reasoning, will enable a deeper understanding of the ideologies of opposing groups, as well as 
their political choices of action during a crisis. 
Furthermore, we contribute to research on organizations and the natural environment 
(ONE) (Jermier & Forbes, 2011b; Kallio & Nordberg, 2006) by providing rich insights into his-
torical studies of ecological crises. The ONE literature has repeatedly highlighted the anthropo-
centric and denatured discourse of organizational studies, arguing for a more ecocentric dis-
course with which to understand the relationship between organizations and the natural envi-
ronment (Hoffman, 1999; Jermier & Forbes, 2011a; Shrivastava, 1994; Waddock, 2011). This 
literature tends towards normative suggestions which typically propose that as ‘stakeholders of 
the earth… with the capacity to act with intelligence, humans could conceivably do so with the 
interests of other living beings, ecosystems, and future generations in mind’ (Waddock, 2011: 
15). Using stakeholder theory as a perspective, such research views the natural environment as 
another stakeholder on the grounds of ‘fairness’: managers need to consider their organization’s 
impact on the environment (see Phillips & Reichart, 2000). We argue for the need to go beyond 
such normative suggestions, and to explore the processes of moral reasoning upon which the 
natural environment is indeed considered as another stakeholder in the frames of opposing 
stakeholder groups. As we explore in our analysis of the Phylloxera Epidemic, it was the persua-
sive frames of the Darwinists and the persistence of the phylloxera in resisting eradication efforts 
that eventually led to the Theists’ acceptance that the vines and the insect had to coexist. How-
ever, we argue that by better understanding the moral reasoning that informs such frames, crises 
might be resolved in favour of more sustainable trajectories.   
In the following sections, we begin by reviewing the organizational literature on ideology 
and develop links to framing and moral reasoning. Next we discuss our methods for data 
gathering and analysis, and explain how we derived the categories in our conceptual framework. 
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We then present our findings and analysis of the Phylloxera Epidemic, and conclude with a dis-
cussion of our analysis and the implications it has for further research. 
Extant Research on Ideology and Framing 
Extant research has defined ideologies as ‘the basic frameworks for organizing the social cogni-
tions shared by members of social groups, organizations or institutions’ (van Dijk, 1995: 248). 
They are ‘an action-oriented system of beliefs’ (Bell, 1962: 400) which functions as the interface 
between the cognitive structures underlying language and action, and the societal position and 
vested interests of social groups (Fairclough, Mulderrig, & Wodak, 2011; Purvis & Hunt, 1993; 
Wodak, 1989). Cognitive structures and processes include the sociocultural knowledge and be-
liefs, shared by a social group. For example, feminists may share beliefs about abortion, corpo-
rate glass ceilings blocking promotion, and other manifestations of systemic discrimination. Such 
beliefs are not only internally structured within the social group, but also externally structured in 
relation to the societal position of the social group against other groups. Similar examples may be 
given for racist vs anti-racist, and corporate vs ecological ideologies. Such ideologies are usually 
constructed through long-term processes of socialisation, by which a group gradually selects and 
retains relevant social norms (van Dijk, 1995, 2006). 
This view is consistent with the perspective on ideologies as the ‘deep structures’ that exist 
in actors’ cognitive maps, which actors instantiate through drawing on them in their daily prac-
tices (Barrett, Heracleous, & Walsham, 2013; Heracleous, 2006; Heracleous & Barrett, 2001). 
These studies highlight that, ‘ideologies are at an elemental level expressed discursively… [and] 
the rhetorical elements that lie at the heart of ideologies frame how issues are interpreted and 
acted upon’ (Barrett et al., 2013: 204). In other words, the relationship between ideology and dis-
course emerges through the political efforts of one social group to define their domination over 
others by using different frames (Grant & Hardy, 2003; Bernardi, Constantinides, and Nan-
dakhumar, 2017; Thompson, 1985). 
While extant organizational research explores how different actors formulate frames to de-
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fend and legitimate their ideologies, our understanding of the process that intertwines the instan-
tiation of ideologies from framing to action remains incomplete. For instance, previous research 
has argued that the links between ideology and discourse can be explored in terms of identifying 
enthymemes (Heracleous & Barrett, 2001), rhetorical strategies (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005) 
and discursive legitimation strategies (Erkama & Vaara, 2010), among others – thereby explain-
ing the instantiation of ideology through communicative action.  
While supporting such research, in the next section, we draw upon, and extend, the work 
of Johnson (1994) and Lakoff (2002), to argue that social groups use processes of moral reaso-
ning to instantiate their ideologies. 
Ideology and Moral Reasoning 
Morality has been traditionally viewed as a system of laws or precepts, whose purpose is to dif-
ferentiate actions, intentions and decisions between those deemed as proper versus those that are 
judged as improper (Williams, 2006). This view has origins in Judeo-Christian traditions and has 
emerged from universal principles of human reason (Donagan, 1979; Kant, 1996). More recent 
studies on cognition and language, however, have begun to change our understanding of morali-
ty. Rather than comprehending morality as a fixed set of laws that need to be interpreted to 
judge a particular situation, this research points to morality as the outcome of an embodied and 
cognitive process of reasoning (Johnson, 1994).  
Although the cognitive approach agrees with more traditional approaches to morality, in-
sofar as that humans generally possess an innate sense of right or wrong, they diverge in their 
respective explanations of how we interpret and respond to situations of moral ambiguity. Moral 
philosophers (e.g. Donagan, 1979; Gerwirth, 1982; Rawls, 2009) broadly agree that we use pre-
cepts (e.g. ‘thou shalt not steal’) – in other words concepts that are understood as possessing a 
defining set of essential characteristics (e.g. Was the theft intentional? Did the object belong to 
someone else? Was harm caused?) to evaluate whether specific situations such as shoplifting or 
even insider trading can be categorised as theft. Instead, cognitive research increasingly supports 
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the idea that our understanding of concepts is anchored in prototypes, and that we interpret situ-
ations in relation to those prototypes (Geeraerts, 2006; Rosch & Lloyd, 1978; Taylor, 2003). 
Thus we understand a concept such as ‘theft’ in terms of a central prototype (e.g. violent mug-
ging, bank robbery, etc.). We evaluate the categorical validity of non-prototype and therefore 
ambiguous cases (e.g. shoplifting, insider trading, etc.) as a gestalt based on a holistic evaluation 
of ‘family resemblances’ rather than a list of necessary and sufficient conditions (Wittgenstein, 
1967). This process by which we draw correspondence between these prototypes and non-
prototypical instances is metaphorical in nature (Lakoff & Johnson, 1985). One common con-
ceptual metaphor we all use on a routine basis is that of ‘Well Being as Wealth’ to draw corres-
pondence between the moral concept of ‘well-being’ and the economic concept of ‘wealth’. 
While we understand and make use of a great number of concepts on a regular basis, we 
necessarily prioritise certain systems of concepts to act upon in a given situation. Such systems of 
concepts are defined as frames (Allan, 2001). The process by which we select frames (i.e. priori-
tise one frame over another) and the metaphorical drawing of correspondence to the prototype 
in our attempt to comprehend and respond to a specific situation is defined as moral reasoning 
(Johnson 1994). While in the majority of situations we encounter, the selection of frames and 
activation of constituent metaphors is reflexive and unproblematic because the situation is close 
to the prototype, in situations that are non-prototypical we must determine a correspondence 
with the prototype, and if unsatisfactory, adjust an existing frame (Johnson, 1994). Therefore, the 
way by which we judge right from wrong and proper from improper, emerges not from the ex-
plicit interpretation of a set of moral laws, but rather a cognitive process of moral reasoning 
through frames and conceptual metaphors. 
To begin to identify the frame choices of different social groups, Lakoff (2002) has argued 
that we should examine their processes of moral reasoning by starting with the conceptual meta-
phor that those groups commonly use to frame their actions. Lakoff illustrates this through an 
analysis of the ideologies of conservatives and liberals in American politics, by examining their 
moral reasoning over different social issues. Conservatives and liberals exist in both the Demo-
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cratic and Republican parties, exemplifying that there are often ideological variations in the same 
party. Lakoff uses the common conceptual metaphor of the ‘nation as family’, with the govern-
ment conceptualised as the parent and the citizens as children, to demonstrate the differences 
between the conservatives’ and the liberals’ processes of moral reasoning and how those pro-
cesses influence the framing of particular issues (e.g. abortion).  
According to Lakoff (2002), conservatives have an ideology based on a Strict Father model 
of the nation as family. This model posits a traditional nuclear family, with the father (i.e. the 
state) having primary responsibility for supporting and protecting the family as well as the au-
thority to set overall policy, to set strict rules for the behaviour of children (i.e. the citizens) and 
to enforce rules. Children must respect and obey their father, because by doing so they build 
character. Self-discipline, self-reliance and respect for legitimate authority are crucial for the de-
velopment of children and for their survival when they mature. Liberals however, have an ideol-
ogy based on the 'Nurturant Parent’ model of the nation as family. Love, empathy and nurtur-
ance are primary because ‘children become responsible, self-disciplined, and self-reliant through 
being cared for and… caring for others’ (Lakoff, 2002: 108). The obedience of children comes 
out of their love and respect for their parents and community rather than fear of punishment. 
‘The principal goal of nurturance is for children to be fulfilled and happy in their lives’ (Lakoff, 
2002: 109). Raising a child to develop their potential for achievement and enjoyment, entails re-
specting the child’s own values by allowing them to explore the range of ideas and options that 
the world offers.  
From this analysis, Lakoff demonstrates how, both the conservatives and liberals draw on 
the common conceptual metaphor of nation as family to reason that the system of concepts (i.e. 
frame) around citizenship (childbearing) will be reproduced in the citizen (the child). The con-
cepts in each model are reflected in the other model, but with greater or lesser priority. For ex-
ample, moral strength appears in the Nurturant Parent model, but it functions not for its own 
sake but rather in the service of nurturance. Also, nurturance appears in the Strict Father model 
but functions only as a consequence of parental authority. Lakoff (2002) defines three conditions 
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for differentiating between (opposing) ideologies, their distinct systems of concepts, and how 
those are framed in communicative actions. 
First, each ideology should offer distinct explanations of why certain beliefs on issues go 
together (e.g. gun control goes with social programs goes with pro-choice goes with environ-
mentalism). Lakoff (2002) argues for the need to focus on conceptual metaphors as a way of 
identifying opposing ideologies, something which has already been proposed in organizational 
research (Heracleous, 2006; Oliver & Johnston, 2000). The key difference, as noted earlier, is 
that by focusing on common conceptual metaphors, research should examine how different sys-
tems of concepts are mediated by the processes of moral reasoning of each group. Such re-
search, we argue, requires a historical analysis of the socio-cultural context within which com-
mon conceptual metaphors are employed to frame various issues and actions. We come back to 
this point below. 
Second, each ideology should offer distinct explanations of why the moral paradoxes of 
one social group (e.g. how can conservatives advocate right to life by being against abortion yet 
be in favour of capital punishment?) are non-paradoxical for another social group (e.g. how can 
liberals favour the rights for children when they champion the rights for criminals such as con-
victed child molesters?) and vice versa. While previous organizational research has broadly defi-
ned morality as ‘rules of the game’ for what is considered appropriate in a given organizational 
setting (Alvesson & Wilmott, 2002), we propose looking beyond a fixed set of laws or norms to 
more explicitly analyse the cognitive processes of moral reasoning of opposing ideologies.  
Lakoff’s final condition is that each ideology should exhibit distinct choices in topics, 
words, and forms of reasoning in framing (e.g. in conservative discourse ‘progressive taxation’ 
proposed by liberals is framed as ‘theft’). Thus, research examining the relationship between ide-
ology and morality should start with the communicative actions between different social groups. 
Previous organizational research has exemplified such an approach (Erkama & Vaara, 2010; 
Mueller et al., 2004; Samra-Fredericks, 2004). 
In considering the applicability of these conditions in the study of ecological crises, we 
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found that some theoretical issues needed to be addressed. Specifically, Lakoff (2010) explains 
that ideological divisions can be overcome through new mutually acceptable frames, for example 
achieving legislative compromise between liberals and conservatives by redefining the problem 
of ‘global warming’ as ‘climate change’. This explanation, however, falls short in explaining the 
shift of frames that is characteristic of long-term historical cases. If ideologies are relatively stable 
cognitive constructs that are widely shared by social groups, how do communicative actions, that 
are instantiations of those ideologies, evolve over time or between different generations of a so-
cial group at the same time? A further problem with attributing the difference between ideologi-
cal deadlock and detente as the absence of mutually acceptable frames is that it leads to a confla-
tion of ideology and the process of moral reasoning. Such conflation leads to the portrayal of 
individuals as ‘cultural dopes’ (Garfinkel, 1967) incapable of reflexively negotiating actions neces-
sary to cope with a crisis.  
The aforementioned issues suggest that further theoretical work is needed (Smith & Lewis, 
2011; Van De Ven, 1986) to resolve this apparent conflation between ideology, the process of 
moral reasoning and communicative action. In response to the first issue, we propose that histo-
ry should endeavour to be more than a chronological summary of events, rather it should afford 
the ability to discover and document the shift of frames over time (Lowenthal, 1985). In res-
ponse to the second, we propose that frames can be adjusted and re-prioritised over time and in 
relation to critical events through a renewed process of moral reasoning. This helps to explain 
why, although ideology remains relatively stable, frames can shift as a consequence of different 
concepts gaining higher priority in response to key historical developments.     
We therefore use Lakoff’s conditions and our extensions to those as analytical starting 
points for our study of the 19th Century French Phylloxera Crisis – an inquiry guided by the 
question: ‘How does the dynamic between ideology and moral reasoning inform actions in an environmental cri-
sis?’ 
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Methods 
The Phylloxera Epidemic destroyed two-thirds of all European vineyards in the late 19th Century. 
This ecological crisis, which spanned several decades, was marked by many critical events, do-
cumented through contemporaneous texts including periodicals and official reports, as well as 
recent histories, which we drew on to carry out our analysis. To achieve a balance between intui-
tion and early pattern recognition (Weick, 1989) and analysis (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), we en-
gaged in a staged approach in order to improve the accuracy and generalisability of our interpre-
tations. The stages of our analysis follow the conditions for differentiating between (opposing) 
ideologies, their distinct systems of concepts and the ways those are framed in communicative 
action as discussed in the previous section. 
Historical Analysis of Critical Events of the Crisis & the Common Conceptual Metaphor Used by 
Different Stakeholder Groups 
Given that a grounded analysis of all data was beyond the bounds of what was rationally possible 
due to the complex nature of the crisis (Pettigrew, 1990), we began with recent histories to pro-
vide a broad overview and focus for our search efforts. Recent histories can unearth new facts to 
improve the veracity of our interpretations (Hargadon & Douglas, 2001) and provide greater 
contextual understanding (Golden, 1992) with which to judge the repercussions and ramifica-
tions of those choices. These recent histories emphasised perspectives that included: general his-
tory (Campbell, 2004; Garrier, 1984, 1989; Ordish, 1987); economic geography (Stevenson, 
1980); and scientific history (Gale, 2003, 2011; Sorenson, Smith, Smith, & Carton, 2008).  
From these sources, we synthesised a broadly inclusive meta-account of how the crisis un-
folded through a series of critical events. A ‘temporal bracketing strategy’ (Langley, 1999) was 
used to organise this meta-account into periods to enable examination of how the actions of a 
previous period led to changes in context that influenced the actions of subsequent periods (Bar-
ley, 1986). The crisis was identified as consisting of five periods which are the: i) pre-crisis, ii) 
emergence of crisis, iii) search for solutions, iv) implementation of solutions, and v) aftermath of 
crisis.  
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This analysis revealed a pattern of strong polarisation with relatively stable configurations 
of constituent stakeholder sub-groups over time. We termed these two groups, the Theists and 
the Darwinists. The two groups can be distinguished in relation to their approach in interpreting 
what caused the crisis. On the one hand, the Theists adopted a ‘disease as effect’ theory, reason-
ing that if the phylloxera was a parasite native to the Americas, American vines would have suc-
cumbed long ago (Pouget, 1990). Therefore, it was neglectful farmers who were culpable by em-
ploying expedient farming practices and making their vines susceptible to adverse weather condi-
tions and parasites such as the phylloxera (Gale, 2003). On the other hand, the Darwinists 
adopted a ‘disease as cause’ theory, reasoning that the host and parasite had co-evolved, resulting 
in gradual adaptations, which afforded American vines resistance to the Phylloxera.  
Theism represented the ideology of the scientific and professional establishment led by the 
Academy of France, the French Ministry of Agriculture, the French Catholic Church, and large 
commercial wine viticulturists, who were largely based in the National capital of Paris. Darwi-
nism represented the ideology of, what was initially, a small and disregarded scientific group in-
fluenced by the then recent theories of Darwin, Lister, Pasteur, and others. This ideology also 
came to be held by small family viticulturists, who were centred in Montpellier, the capital of the 
Midi1 wine growing region and the epicentre of the epidemic. Figures 1a and 1b illustrate a time-
line of the Phylloxera epidemic as it unfolded between these opposing ideologies through critical 
events that marked the struggle to make sense of, and then respond to the epidemic. 
———————————— 
Figures 1a and 1b about here 
————————————  
We then examined the evolution of major French institutions such as the Catholic Church 
(Ford, 2005) and the body politic (Weber, 1979, 1991). Further accounts (Barthes, 1983; Echik-
son, 2005; Fourcade, 2012; Pitte, 2008; Simpson, 2011) granted us a more nuanced understan-
ding of the economic, cultural and regional variation of the wine industry, thus sensitising us to 
                                                 
1 ‘Le Midi’ is term which literally means the position of the midday sun - a colloquial Paris-centric term used to 
describe the provincial departments of southern France. 
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the ideological importance of wine in French culture – both of regional differences and common 
national values. Biographies and accounts of several key scientific figures such as Pasteur (La-
tour, 1988) and Darwin (Desmond & Moore, 1992) enabled a better understanding of the tenta-
tive nature of new scientific discoveries (e.g. germ theory of disease) and technological innova-
tions of the period (e.g. steamships, agricultural technologies, etc.) and then followed their deve-
lopment as paradigms over the period of the crisis.  
By iterating between our contextual understanding and the conceptual metaphors that cha-
racterised the Theists and Darwinists, we concluded that the common metaphor used by both 
groups was ‘wine as a form of identity construction’. The various debates between the two op-
posing ideologies could be seen as frames that were based on this common conceptual meta-
phor. The initial debates, which concerned the cause of the epidemic (i.e. theories of disease as 
‘cause’ vs ‘effect’), became implicated in the ideologically-rooted conflict over the present plight 
of post-Napoleonic France. The latter debates, concerning the response to the disease (i.e. ap-
proaches of ‘adaptation’ through grafting vs maintaining ‘purity’ through eradication), were also a 
reflection of the Theists’ angst over projections of possible futures for French identity, and the 
Darwinists’ construction of human identity in relation to other species in the natural environ-
ment. From this we determined the two respective variations on the common conceptual meta-
phor ‘wine as identity construction’ could be distinguished as ‘wine as progression’ and ‘wine as 
tradition’ (see Table 1, upper section). 
Prioritizing Different Frames through Moral Reasoning 
Having now established the differences between these opposing ideologies, we returned to con-
temporary accounts of critical events (e.g. editorial articles, news reports, official papers, etc.) to 
understand the process of moral reasoning of each stakeholder group. For example, in working 
iteratively between the main theories with which the Darwinists and Theists’ explained the pro-
blem, namely ‘disease as cause’ versus ‘disease as effect’, it was possible to inductively extend our 
understanding of the processes of moral reasoning within these two respective ideologies.  
The Theists’ initial view of the insect as 'insignificant’ was possible if understood within a 
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broader struggle between ‘good' and ‘evil’, with one’s relative moral authority depending upon 
one’s relative position within a hierarchy of nature under humans, and humans under god. By 
contrast, the Darwinist position could only be reconciled through an understanding of the world 
as a complex ecosystem of many diverse and competing species, whose continued survival wi-
thin that ecosystem was determined not by moral authority, but rather by their ‘fitness’ in adap-
ting to the contingencies of that environment. The Darwinists saw change as necessary for a 
species to adapt to a changing environment and therefore proposed a solution that would enable 
the vines to quickly adapt to the Phylloxera. The Theists however, saw the world through the 
perspective of hierarchical structures earned through righteousness and moral rectitude, and thus 
a strong interest in maintaining those structures.   
In our analysis of the frames used by members of these opposing groups were notable 
for several key differences. For example, in describing the role of viticulturists in the epidemic, 
the Theists reasoned towards frames premised on concepts of moral intent (e.g. ‘good’, ‘evil’, 
‘laziness’, ‘neglect’) while the Darwinists employed frames characterised by concepts related to 
emergence and unintended consequence (e.g. adaptation, modification, context). When the de-
bate turned to the role of the insect, the Theists used frames to downplay its ability (e.g. 
‘smallness’, ‘hidden life’) or gave it supernatural agency (e.g. ‘a plague’, ‘the evil’), while the Dar-
winists, particularly in their attempts to describe the insect itself, tended towards frames that 
granted it anthropomorphic characteristics (e.g. ‘good bourgeoisie’, ‘the Moor’) or in familiar 
terms (e.g. wolves and sheep, caterpillars and cabbages). 
From this insight, we further determined ‘wine as progression’ and ‘wine as tradition’ as 
premised upon underlying concepts of structure, essence and agency. ‘Structure’ refers to the 
nature of the known world, ‘essence’ to that which determines the relative positioning within the 
known world, and ‘agency’ to the imperative to maintain or improve that relative positioning (see 
Table 1, lower section). Table 1 represents the most salient aspects of the key concepts of, as 
well as the crucial areas of disagreement between, the Theists and the Darwinists. 
———————— 
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Table 1 about here 
———————— 
Analysis 
In this final stage, we conducted an analysis of key texts to determine how the concepts of struc-
ture, essence and agency of the Theists and the Darwinists were prioritised over time. In particu-
lar, we sought to understand how the Theists eventually came around to seeing Phylloxera as the 
cause even though they disagreed initially, and how they finally acquiesce to grafting as the solu-
tion. Also, we sought to understand why the Darwinists initially proposed targeting the insect 
but then seized grafting as the solution well before the Theists did. 
Here, we synthesised the overall frames of each side with regards to attributing cause and 
prescribing response at the initial, intermediate and final phases of the crisis, which we show in 
Table 2. What we found was that the Darwinists’ priorities changed little because they remained 
congruent with the evolving context. As for the Theists however, concepts of structure were 
prioritised in the initial phases of the epidemic, but as the crisis worsened and the ability to pur-
sue different courses of action dwindled, concepts of structure were backgrounded and concepts 
of agency prioritised. 
———————— 
Table 2 about here 
———————— 
These findings allowed us to theorise how different concepts were re-prioritised and ac-
tions shifted over time, enabling opposing groups to overcome disagreements. The Theists, in-
fluenced by the French Catholic Church and their national pride, reasoned that adherence to the 
strict hierarchy of moral authority, moral strength through self-discipline, and 'good' character, 
and the preservations of moral boundaries was the only solution. The Darwinists however, rea-
soned that the crisis could be resolved by accepting that humans are but another species in the 
ecosystem, requiring that we and the vine must adapt to changing conditions. Through these un-
derlying processes of moral reasoning, opposing groups prioritised frames with different systems 
of concepts over time, allowing for the impasse to be resolved.  
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For the purpose of brevity, we mainly confine our account to the second and third of the 
five stages of the crisis. Therefore, in the next section, we begin by describing the early stages of 
the Phylloxera Epidemic, and then explain how hypotheses were developed, positions drawn, 
and responses proposed. We conclude with an abridged account of how this crisis was eventually 
resolved – a solution upon which viticulturists still depend upon to the present day.  
The Phylloxera Epidemic 
The Crisis Begins and Two Opposing Ideologies Emerge 
In 1867, a mysterious malady caused the leaves of vines to yellow and their roots to blacken and 
rot in the village of Roquemaure, near Avignon, with the entire plant eventually succumbing over 
the next two or three seasons (Campbell, 2004; Gale, 2003). Over successive growing seasons, 
the progress of this malady was likened to the ‘gradual spreading of a spot of oil’ (Planchon, 
1874: 553) that soon grew into the shape of an ‘hourglass’ along the Rhône valley. Although the 
dead vines had roots which were blackened, rotted and knotted with tumours, no direct cause 
was visible (Garrier, 1989). The local chamber of commerce responded by appointing a commis-
sion led by Jules-Émile Planchon, a Botany Professor at the University of Montpellier, to inspect 
an affected vineyard. Upon accidentally digging up an apparently healthy vine, and discovering its 
roots covered with clusters of small yellow aphids, the commission quickly concluded that the 
insect was the cause of the malady (Gale, 2011). 
From these same field reports, the Paris-based scientific establishment concluded diffe-
rently. The insect was merely a symptom. This divergence in opinion was rooted in two 
longstanding but competing theories of disease, respectively named ‘disease as effect’ and ‘di-
sease as cause’, which had implications for how empirical phenomena were understood. Plan-
chon (1874: 554) summarised the differences as follows: 
... the role of Phylloxera in the new malady of the vine may be reduced to two: the Phylloxera effect 
and the Phylloxera cause… According to the first theory, Phylloxera would be the result of enfee-
blement… due, according to some theorists, to long-term monoculture, or wrong training of the vine 
(too short, too long, too severe pruning). 
The ‘disease as effect’ theory viewed the body as a harmonious system with the states of 
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health and disease as the result of systemic balance or imbalance, and was the official doctrine 
for all biology-based disciplines including medicine, zoology, entomology and botany in 19th 
France (Gale, 2011; Pelling, 1993). The ‘disease as cause’ theory however, saw disease as the re-
sult of a ‘contagion’ or ‘germs’ that infected the body (Cohen, 1961). It was around these two 
respective theories of disease that, two ideologically opposed camps began to emerge, the The-
ists and the Darwinists. 
Small viticulturists were split over the cause of the disease due to the slow and uneven 
spread of the epidemic. Lowland vineyards generally succumbed before those at higher eleva-
tions. It was not uncommon for some areas to report complete devastation while adjacent areas 
recorded harvests (Stevenson, 1980). Yet unaffected viticulturists were often skeptical of the 
Darwinists explanations, thus tending to side with the Theists (Ordish, 1987). A few claimed the 
Epidemic to be a divine punishment that afflicted the villages of the less pious, with some viti-
culturists resorting to pagan rituals such as placing crosses of hazel branches to ward off evil 
(Campbell, 2004) or burying dead toads to draw poison from the vines (Robinson, 2006). For 
those affected, initially small viticulturists in the Midi, observations of Phylloxera on the roots of 
dying vines and their absence on the roots of adjacent healthy vines were proof of disease as 
cause. As the numbers of affected viticulturists in each wine region reached majority however, 
explanations based on lax morality waned (Garrier, 1989) as they committed to the Darwinist 
position. 
(Re-)Prioritizing Frames to Contain the Crisis 
The Theists were found to be influenced by the French Catholic Church and nationalist pride, as 
well as the official doctrine of ‘disease as effect’, dominant in all biology-based disciplines in 19th 
France (Gale, 1979; Pelling, 1993). The Theists held a hierarchical view of the position of hu-
mans in relation to God and nature. The proposition that the Phylloxera could be the cause of 
the crisis, defied this belief. Félix Édouard Guérin-Méneville (quoted by de Ceris, 1873: 674), a 
prominent entomologist and a member of the Academy of Science argued: 
This parasite is not the cause, but a consequence... its smallness, its hidden life, and its insignifi-
~ 18 ~ 
cance as a zoological species undistinguished among the innumerable species of the groups of para-
sites within which it belonged. 
This concept of structure justified the authority of scientific, bureaucratic and religious in-
stitutions over that of local practices and induction from empirical observation. Conversely, the 
Darwinists did not see hierarchical position as a factor in assigning responsibility or blame for 
the crisis. Instead they reversed the weight placed on these same values, and were therefore open 
to the possibility that the Phylloxera, despite its ‘smallness’ could be the cause. Gaston Bazille 
(1868: 522), a commercial viticulturist argued: 
It is possible that the original lice did choose in preference a sick vine; however, once established, they 
have become in and of themselves, and independent of all other facts – cold, drought, impoverished 
soil, excesses of humidity – a cause, and unhappily a cause very actively withering and killing the 
remaining vines. The opinions of our adversaries don’t explain at all the advancement of the disease, 
or the present state of the vineyards. 
Still, the Theists, reasoned that one’s moral strength is determined by his/her adherence to 
moral hierarchy; they argued that it was ‘lazy’ agricultural practices that left the vines susceptible 
to parasites such as the Phylloxera. The Editor of the Journal de Villefraiche (quoted Garrier, 1984: 
123) reported that: 
It is believed that... the plague is a just punishment inflicted on the vignerons of the southern 
Rhône... for their bloated production. 
This concept of essence reinforced attitudes that those affected deserved punishment and 
were less worthy of assistance, thus justifying the ultimately ineffective policy of purification 
through the quarantine and elimination of diseased vines. As with other human and agricultural 
epidemics, the initial response was quarantine. Local officials ordered that affected vineyards be 
identified, dug up and torched. Small viticulturists attempted to salvage some value by selling 
their dead vines as firewood, which helped the Phylloxera to spread by allowing it to drop from 
the dead vines onto yet unaffected vineyards (Stevenson, 1980). Some found that the prolonged 
flooding of a vineyard could drown the Phylloxera, an approach that required the use of large 
steam-driven pumps, teams of workers to build dykes around the vineyard, and was only suitable 
for vineyards on flat ground (Ordish, 1987). In addition, sulphur-based pesticides were highly 
flammable and only effective in certain soils (Campbell, 2004) and often toxic to adjacent fruit 
~ 19 ~ 
and vegetable crops (Simpson, 2011). Both immersion and pesticides were prohibitively costly 
for all but the wealthiest viticulturists, such as the owners of well-known properties in the Bor-
deaux and Burgundy (ibid), and was not a permanent cure as they required repeated annual 
treatment (Gale, 2011).  
In contrast, the Darwinists reasoned that the ecosystem is dynamic and subject to constant 
change. Rather than attempting to control the Phylloxera through quarantine and eradication, 
they sought to understand the insect’s lifecycle in order to develop a solution. Planchon (quoted 
in Cazalis, 1869: 238) advocated: 
It is useless to look elsewhere for the cause, unhappily too evident, of the malady and the deaths.... 
What is now necessary to find is no longer to find the cause of the malady, it is its remedy.  
Research by Riley eventually confirmed that the Phylloxera could live above and below 
ground, adapting to local conditions (Sorenson et al., 2008). In Europe, the Phylloxera seemed to 
live almost entirely below ground – leading to speculation that it multiplied through asexual re-
production (Campbell, 2004). The idea that Phylloxera could reproduce without a male counter-
part was attacked by the Theists and especially the French Catholic Church (Ordish, 1987). De-
spite the failure of early attempts, the Theists continued to advocate eradication through pesti-
cide treatment. Just as previous infestations were controlled through pesticides, the Imperial 
Minister of Agriculture, Clément Duvernois, pleaded for ‘men of science’ to find a solution and 
offered a reward of 20,000 Francs “to be awarded to the one who finds an effective and practical 
means of defeating the new disease known as the Phylloxera” (Duvernois, 1870, quoted in 
Campbell, 2004: 112). 
The Darwinists reasoned along the concept of adaptation (i.e. species must adapt to 
changing conditions to survive). They eventually argued that the only practical way forward was 
to adapt the vine through approaches such as grafting the American Vitis on the rootstock of the 
European Vitis Vinifera. Planchon (1874, p.566) proposed: 
Given the age-old existence of Phylloxera in the United States and the rapid death of European 
vines, it is clear that American vines possess the power to resist their secular enemy... they are gener-
ally sturdier than their civilised descendants. It is possible that a process of natural selection bit by 
bit eliminated those wild vines that could not fight the enemy insect in varying degree...  
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Meanwhile, the Theists conversely reasoned that eradication was the only solution, based 
on the concept of preservation. They viewed the American Vitis as ‘impure’, which would create 
‘‘centaurs’’ and ‘‘chimeras’’ (Mudge, Janick, Scofield, & Goldschmidt, 2009) that would ‘‘taint 
pure French vines’’. The Country Life correspondent for Le Temps (de Cherville, 1878: 4) exhort-
ed: 
The fight must continue [with insecticide] and any recourse to America forsworn until, should it 
come, the very day of defeat... and we cannot entirely despair that... will not one day result in a prac-
tical and economic remedy that will save our French vines entire from the tip of their stems to the 
base of their roots... 
This sentiment was shared by large commercial viticulturists, particularly those with presti-
gious properties in the Bordeaux and Burgundy, who sought to preserve the pedigree of their 
vines. In 1879, the Ministry of Agriculture exclusively sanctioned pesticide treatment, and prohi-
bited imports of American Vitis, except to areas already completely destroyed by the Phylloxera. 
In areas dominated by small viticulturists such as the Burgundy, this led to conflict between local 
officials tasked with enforcing regulations and desperate family viticulturists who illicitly planted 
American Vitis rootstock to reconstitute their devastated vineyards (Gale, 2011).  
Despite the vast commitment of resource, the Theists’ policy of eradication failed to slow 
the advance of Phylloxera across France. The Superior Commission of the 1881 Phylloxera 
Congress in Bordeaux conducted a review of all available scientific papers, white papers and 
other field reports and concluded that apart from the experiments with grafted rootstock and 
hybrid vines, no other solution proved effective or economically viable (Phylloxera., 1883). 
Furthermore, wine tastings were demonstrating that wine from the fruit of grafted Vitis vinifera 
was indistinguishable from that of the ‘pure’ Vitis vinifera (Campbell, 2004). For reasons of taste 
and authenticity however, the option of reconstitution through hybrid vitis-American vines 
found relatively little official support and was quickly ruled out (Ordish, 1987). 
The Aftermath  
Nearly a decade of intensive research was still required to develop new hybrid species of 
rootstock, that were tolerant of a broader range of soil and climate conditions, to enable the full 
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reconstitution of all French viticultural regions (Paul, 1997). In 1887, the Ministry of Agriculture 
finally reversed the policy of eradication and began to subsidise the reconstitution of vineyards 
through American vitis rootstock grafts (Campbell, 2004). Although grafting practices were ini-
tially developed by small viticulturists in Burgundy, the large-scale commercial viticulturists, par-
ticularly those of the Bordeaux, finally committed to reconstitution by the 1890s (Simpson, 
2011). The reconstitution effort precipitated a massive shift from traditional mixed crop farming. 
Growers unable or unwilling to reconstitute, abandoned viticulture for the intensive cultivation 
of fruits and vegetable crops, livestock and horticulture. Consolidation among remaining viticul-
turists drove the transformation of winemaking into one dominated by large-scale commercial 
viticulturists (Margadant, 1979). 
Discussion 
In our analysis of the Phylloxera Epidemic we examined the dynamic between ideology 
and moral reasoning, and how this dynamic informs how stakeholders understand and respond 
to an ecological crisis. Using the common conceptual metaphor of ‘wine as a form of identity 
construction’, our analysis revealed that, there were two distinct ideologies influencing the fra-
ming of, and response to, the crisis, namely, the Theists and Darwinists. We discussed the res-
pective processes of moral reasoning of each of these ideologies, and showed that while drawing 
on the same conceptual metaphor, the two stakeholder groups prioritised different concepts to 
justify and legitimate actions relative to the Phylloxera Epidemic as the crisis unfolded.  
The key contribution of this paper is to extend our current conceptualisations of how dif-
ferent groups frame a crisis based on their ideology, by emphasising the role of moral reasoning 
in this process. As we have seen in our analysis of the Phylloxera Epidemic, the Theists were ini-
tially found to ideologically resist acknowledging the agency of the Phylloxera. However, as time 
went by and the crisis unfolded to the point of completely destroying all vineyards and in exten-
sion a large part of the French economy, the Theists adjusted their frame regarding who and 
what possessed agency. The phylloxera was now reframed as possessing the capability to destroy 
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one of France’s main industries. It is only at the point where other approaches to eradicate the 
Phylloxera failed, that the Theists acknowledged the viability of reconstitution through the graf-
ting of French vines on American rootstock. In this sense, they did not renounce their ideology, 
but rather, they re-positioned themselves against the crisis and the actions that needed to be tak-
en by extending their frames to accept a previously unacceptable position. Indeed, the Theists 
were able to maintain their underlying ideology, while at the same time pragmatically changing 
their actions towards the crisis.  
 The Theists came to agree with the Darwinists on the solution to the crisis, not out of a 
master frame that reconciled both perspectives. Rather, key critical events in the crisis forced 
them to adjust their moral reasoning to reconcile their ideology with actions needed to sufficient-
ly respond to the crisis. Initially, the Theists were found to reason that they needed to preserve 
the entire French vine (Vitis vinifera) from ‘the tips to the roots’ in order to save wine. As the 
crisis unfolded, the Theists eventually came to accept that the goodness of a vine should be eval-
uated by that part of the vine that is above the earth, with the rootstock now only a neutral con-
duit between the vine and its terroir. Furthermore, as the process of reconstitution entered the 
latter stages, the ability to choose between different courses of action increased as the crisis 
eased, which enabled a return to concepts of structure. Hierarchy would become the fore-
grounded concept and preservation was backgrounded as hybrids were outlawed and new classi-
fications of regions and permissible species of vine and wine-making techniques were imposed 
through the AOC (Appellation d’Origine Contrôlée or controlled name of origin) system. 
While intransigence is often dismissed as negative, we found that it played a generative role 
as it forced both sides to experiment with and develop their theories of causality and potential 
solutions. The Theists continued to develop their experiments to eradicate the insect through 
flooding, sand planting and pesticides. In particular, the pesticide approach evolved significantly 
in terms of different formulations and application technologies. At the same time, the Darwinists 
used this period to identify and breed different rootstocks for grafting that were suitable for the 
varied climate and soil conditions across the viticultural regions of France. Scientists on both 
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sides continued to develop, test and reject various hypotheses regarding the Phylloxera until an 
adequate understanding of its life cycle was achieved. Indeed, despite the emergence of grafting 
techniques among small Burgundy viniculturists in the 1870s, nearly a decade would be required 
to marshal the breadth and depth of national resources and capabilities before large-scale imple-
mentation of the reconstitution effort could begin. It was the time and space afforded by this 
intransigence that enabled a failing course of action to be abandoned in favour of a more sustai-
nable trajectory out of crisis.  
We now turn to the implications of these theoretical insights for organizational research in 
ecological crises. 
Implications 
Our research has implications for understanding debates around different crises by em-
phasising the process of moral reasoning in the instantiation of a group’s ideology. Although 
Johnson’s (1994) and Lakoff’s (2002) work has already been applied in a variety of social and 
political studies to understand how different groups prioritise various concepts through their 
respective ideologies to frame political action (Edgell, 2012; Massengill, 2008; McAdams et al., 
2008), the role of morality has been largely overlooked in organizational studies.  
In particular, some research recognises the importance of morality for understanding or-
ganizational action, but without explicitly linking it to ideologies (Feldman & Feldman, 2006; 
Whittle & Mueller, 2012). In cases, where such an explicit link is provided, the focus is not on 
how moral reasoning mediates debates over a crisis, but rather on how morality can question 
conventional approaches to understanding power and dominance in organizational settings (Kir-
by & Harter, 2003; Marston, 2000). Further, some organizational research has examined the role 
of arguments for morality in rhetorical strategies of legitimation, whereby actors invoke emotive 
moral claims to appeal to human concerns (Erkama & Vaara, 2010; Vaara & Tienari, 2008), and 
to express emotion or ‘move an audience’ (Samra-Fredericks, 2004). While this research offers 
insight into how moral claims can move communicative action, it has not offered deeper insight 
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into the underlying process of moral reasoning.  
Our research contributes to organizational studies by examining the dynamic between ide-
ology and moral reasoning, and it informs how stakeholders understand and respond to an eco-
logical crisis. As Johnson observed, ‘Many of the most pressing moral debates, however, concern 
whether we should extend the scope of morality beyond our anthropocentric world to embrace 
other forms of life and even the ecosystem as a whole’ (1994: 254). Our findings build upon 
these ideas about the link between moral reasoning and ecological sustainability by showing how 
ideologies tend to become more apparent when a crisis creates an imperative to choose between 
different courses of action. Crises often lead to the reawakening of inconsequential or dormant 
ideological divides, because actors must inevitably employ conceptual metaphors in their framing 
to take positions on these issues. Thereby, in extending Lakoff’s (2002) work, we argued that, in 
times of crises, key critical events (Kieser, 1994) push actors to shift their frames while engaging 
in processes of moral reasoning. This has helped us to explain why, although ideology remains 
relatively stable, frames can shift as actors reason how to respond to a crisis.  
Our study, therefore, responds to previous calls for the integration of history into organi-
zational studies (Clark & Rowlinson, 2004; Kieser, 1994; Suddaby, Foster, & Mills, 2014; 
Wadhwani & Bucheli, 2014). As Clark and Rowlinson (2004) argue, most longitudinal research 
hinges on ahistorical assumptions about the universalism of human and organizational behaviour 
and a timeless present. In this study, we have moved the analysis beyond the boundaries of or-
ganizational studies’ disciplinary orientations to consider the deeper theoretical and methodolog-
ical issues that a call for historical research raises (Wadhwani & Bucheli, 2014). We exemplify the 
use of both recent histories and contemporaneous texts in the analysis of conceptual metaphors 
and framing across opposing stakeholder groups during a crisis. 
Furthermore, we contribute to research on organizations and the natural environment 
(ONE) (Jermier & Forbes, 2011b; Kallio & Nordberg, 2006) by providing rich insights into his-
torical studies of ecological crises. ONE scholars have repeatedly called for a less anthropocen-
tric and more ecologically focused discourse with which to understand the relationship between 
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organizations and the natural environment (Hoffman, 1999; Jermier, Forbes, Benn, & Orsato, 
2006; Shrivastava, 1994; Stead & Stead, 2009) and to consider how moral claims influence the 
actions of opposing stakeholder groups on the natural environment (Phillips & Reichart, 2000; 
Waddock, 2011). We respond by offering a fresh perspective on the effects of framing on sustai-
nable development by placing emphasis on the process of moral reasoning, explaining how diffe-
rent frames get re-prioritised by opposing stakeholder groups at different points in time. 
This is one of the first studies to explicitly offer an analysis of the moral reasoning of di-
verse stakeholder groups during a crisis, and how such reasoning contributes to frame shifting  
over key historical events. As we explore in our analysis of the Phylloxera Epidemic, it was the 
persuasive arguments of the Darwinists and the persistence of the phylloxera in resisting eradica-
tion efforts that eventually led to the Theists’ re-prioritisation of key frames and their acceptance 
that the vines and the insect had to coexist. Our theoretical and methodological focus on key 
historical events and the conceptual metaphors used by different stakeholders to make sense and 
respond to the crisis has enabled a deeper analysis of the process of moral reasoning that influ-
ences the trajectory of a crisis. In particular, our theoretical and methodological focus has 
enabled a deeper understanding of how different stakeholders remain consistent with their ide-
ology, yet able to flexibly shift their actions towards the crisis.  
These theoretical contributions can be applied to the analyses of more recent crises such as 
HIV and the Ebola and Zika virus outbreaks (Leach et al., 2010). We can also approach the 
broader debate over whether human activity has detrimentally affected the climate through an 
analysis of the key frames being prioritised by opposing ideologies. The climate change debate is 
often centred on opposing frames. These include, the potential for losses in terms of economic 
competitiveness and the attendant affects upon employment and economic prosperity; flooded 
coastal cities and societal collapse; and equity in terms of the shared burden for sustainability 
measures between developing and developed economies (Heggelund, 2007; Leiserowitz, 2005). 
This has led to inevitable disputes over priorities for action (e.g. economic growth versus cutting 
carbon emissions) and thus intransigence and failure to achieve necessary consensus for attempts 
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to implement broad multilateral agreements on reducing emissions of greenhouse gases such as 
the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 (Nordhaus & Boyer, 1999). Within the context of such frames, local 
anecdotes that contradict assertions of global warming receive as much attention as comprehen-
sive peer-reviewed analyses (Hulme, 2009). 
As with the case of the Phylloxera Epidemic, this state of intransigence also offers the time 
and space for experimenting, developing and implementing prerequisite new technologies, policy 
mechanisms and business models. Furthermore, existing courses of action such as maintaining 
the status quo need to be cast into doubt and thus begin to lose their legitimacy. For example, 
media coverage of the inundation of New Orleans by Hurricane Katrina has had a role in rever-
sing doubts over the veracity of climate change in American society (Boykoff, 2007; Giddens, 
2009). Lakoff (2010) argues that the ongoing effort to reframe the issue of ‘global warming’ as 
‘climate change’ has been a key factor in gaining bipartisan support for legislative moves to re-
duce greenhouse gas emissions among American Liberals and Conservatives (Kerry & Graham, 
2009). New frames can be constructed through moral reasoning so as to accommodate those 
groups, who simply perceive weather and climate patterns as deviating from historical norms (i.e. 
whether hotter, colder or simply more extreme), and reconcile with those who view the climate 
getting progressively warmer. Such new frames can help create a ‘bigger tent’ that accommodates 
greater diversity in worldviews and makes collective action more likely. 
Therefore, it is by understanding how the ideologies of opposing stakeholder groups are 
instantiated that a common ground can be found upon which solutions to a crisis can be enact-
ed. Ultimately, any frame that enables us to regard our natural environment as merely a resources 
or means to an end is inferior to one that recognises the complexity interactions between organ-
isms that comprise that ecosystem. As we have shown with the example of the Phylloxera Epi-
demic, crises can be mitigated and the worst consequences averted by eventual consensus 
through an adaptation of frames to reconcile deeply rooted ideological differences, which, as in 
the case of climate change, can threaten to lock us into unsustainable trajectories of develop-
ment.   
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Figure 1a – Timeline of Crisis: Making sense of the epidemic 
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Figure 1b – Timeline of Crisis: Responding to the epidemic 
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Table 1 – Key ideological differences 
 Darwinists Theists 
Primary 
stake-
holders 
Initially a small group of scientists 
influenced by recent theories of 
Darwin, Lister, Pasteur, etc.; and 
small viticulturists centred in the 
Midi. 
The Paris-based scientific establish-
ment led by the Academy of France; 
the Ministry of Agriculture; the 
Catholic Church; and large viticultur-
ists. 
Common 
conceptual 
metaphor 
Wine as a form of identity construction 
Variations 
of the 
common 
conceptual 
metaphor 
Wine as progression 
Like culture and nationhood, wine 
emerges from complexity and thus 
must remain open to change and 
renewal. 
Wine as tradition 
Wine is a manifestation of the purity 
and tradition of culture and nation-
hood and thus must remain resolutely 
French. 
Concepts 
of 
structure 
Structure as eco-system 
Humans (and the vine) are a species 
within a broader ecology. Interac-
tions are manifold, complex and 
emergent, with each species occupy-
ing unique positions within a heter-
ogeneous ecosystem. 
Structure as hierarchy 
The world is a cosmic hierarchy (e.g. 
man under god, woman under man, 
man above nature, centre above pe-
riphery, French vines over others, 
etc.) whose moral rectitude deter-
mines one’s authority and standing. 
Concepts 
of essence 
Essence as adaptation 
The ecosystem is dynamic and sub-
ject to constant change, with the 
imperative of survival determined by 
the extent of adaptation by a species 
to local selective environmental 
pressures. Adaptation is strength 
and maladaptation is weakness. 
Essence as rectitude 
The world is divided into good and 
evil with entities having an essential 
character that determines their con-
duct. Good/evil is equated with moral 
strength/weakness. Strength is gained 
through self-discipline and restraint 
(i.e. being ‘upright’) while weakness 
comes from self-indulgence and lazi-
ness (i.e. ‘falling’ down’ and thus vul-
nerable to evil. 
Concepts 
of agency 
Agency as change 
Survival depends on the ability to 
change to suit environmental con-
tingencies. If the environment is be-
yond our control or comprehension, 
then we must address the problem 
by changing new practices for dys-
functional ones. 
Agency as preservation 
Goodness is the preservation of the 
order and integrity of predetermined 
structures, while evil is the chaos and 
decay. Evil is fought through purifica-
tion and exclusion to maintain these 
boundaries. If boundaries are not 
maintained, evil like disease, can 
spread. 
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Table 2 – Re-prioritising key frames in the crisis 
 Darwinists Theists 
Initial frame 
The interaction of species is com-
plex, therefore the cause may be best 
determined through empirical ob-
servation of local phenomena and 
inductive reasoning. The insect is the 
cause, therefore we must directly 
target the insect. 
A mere insect cannot be the cause of 
the blight. Provincial scientists can-
not know better than the scientists of 
the capital. Lazy practices by the 
morally weak have ‘enfeebled’ the 
vines, making them susceptible to 
parasites and adverse climate. 
Intermediate 
frame 
The insect must be understood on 
equal terms (i.e. an anthropomorphic 
perpective). The nature and dynamic 
of the Phylloxera lifecycle can be 
better understood through the study 
of local context and interactions. 
The insect is an evil over which man, 
if worthy, should eventually prevail 
(i.e. an anthropocentric perspective). 
It must be excluded (e.g. quarantines, 
import bans) and purged by all pos-
sible measures (e.g. flooding, fire, 
pesticides). 
Final frame 
Complete eradication of a well-
adapted species such as the Phyllox-
era is neither practical nor possible. 
Growing practices and the vines 
themselves must be adapted to sur-
vive. French vines will be preserved 
through the adoption of American 
rootstock. 
The insect is an evil that is kept at 
bay through the use of rootstocks to 
preserve the French vine. Hybrid 
vines and and fake wines however 
must be eliminated and the purity of 
traditional practices must be re-
stored. 
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